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Strict Liability for Sellers of Used Products: 
A Conceptual Rationale and Current Status 
Karl A. Boedecker and Fred W. Morgan 
Marketers of used products face uncertainty in the legal environment because of the 
inconsistent ways their offerings are treated with respect to strict product liability. The 
authors analyze the conceptual underpinnings of strict liability to assess its applicability to 
used goods. Then they examine litigated cases to present an overview of current judicial 
treatment of defective used products. Finally, they discuss policy issues related to used prod- 
ucts in the context of both the law and marketing. 
The doctrine of strict product liability for sellers of 
new goods developed during the mid-twentieth cen- 
tury in large part out of vigorous academic debate 
and discussion [Priest 1985]. William Prosser [1960] cham- 
pioned the strict product liability doctrine in his seminal ar- 
ticle, "Assault Upon the Citadel." He subsequently synthe- 
sized the academic dialogue with the relevant judicial opin- 
ions as Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
[1965].1 By then, California had openly embraced strict lia- 
bility for personal injury recoveries in defective product 
cases [Greenman v. Yuba Power Products 1963]. Other ju- 
risdictions oon followed, and Prosser [1966] eventually pro- 
claimed that the "citadel had fallen." 
Subsequent issues surrounding strict liability have cen- 
tered on the extent to which the doctrine should apply. For 
example, should marketers of services be subjected to strict 
liability in a manner similar to their product-oriented coun- 
terparts [Morgan 1987]? Should nonmanufacturing fran- 
chisors be held to a strict liability standard for the defective 
output of their franchisees [Hadfield 1990]? A related ques- 
tion concerns ellers of used goods-should they be strictly 
liable for injuries caused by the products they sell but have 
typically not manufactured? 
This question is approached here by considering the the- 
ory of strict product liability as originally conceived by 
torts scholars and later embodied in section 402A of the Re- 
statement [1965]. A brief examination of some leading 
cases illustrates how judges relied on those theoretical con- 
cepts to forge modern product liability law. We then review 
recent case law involving questions of strict seller liability 
for product-related injuries from used goods.2 We also con- 
sider to what extent the same circumstances (marketing, ec- 
onomic, and social) that gave rise to strict product liability 
for new goods are also relevant for used goods. 
Development of the Concept of Strict 
Product Liability 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, rapid industriali- 
zation and expanding markets had resulted in multilevel dis- 
tribution systems that placed intermediaries between manu- 
facturers and final buyers. These distribution channels, cou- 
pled with "privity of contract,"3 effectively precluded recov- 
eries in product injury cases. Unless a consumer could estab- 
lish either an enforceable warranty on the part of the imme- 
diate supplier or negligence in designing, producing, or fail- 
ing to inspect the defective item, he or she had to absorb the 
loss from the injury. 
The New York Court of Appeals began to erode the priv- 
ity doctrine in personal injury actions in MacPherson v. 
Buick Motor Company [1916] by extending a manufac- 
turer's liability beyond its immediate purchaser (most often 
a wholesaler or retail dealer). Though some jurisdictions fol- 
lowed MacPherson's lead, they initially did so only for man- 
ufacturers of "imminently dangerous" products, which typ- 
ically included food, drugs, and automobiles. Even in those 
jurisdictions adopting MacPherson, the privity requirement 
remained for injuries from products not classified as "inher- 
ently dangerous," and for all such actions in other jurisdic- 
tions. Furthermore, injured consumers often had great diffi- 
culty proving negligence against manufacturers and others 
within the distribution chain. 
Tort scholars became disenchanted with negligence as 
the sole basis for product injury claims, arguing that the neg- 
ligence doctrine alone would not meet all the emerging pub- 
lic policy objectives of tort law. In his 1941 treatise, Pros- 
ser [p. 1141] set forth what he regarded as "all of the valid 
arguments supporting strict liability": 
* The public interest in the utmost safety of products; 
* The demand for the maximum protection of the consumer; 
* The assurance to consumers that is implied by placing the 
goods on the market for human use; 
* The consumer's justifiable reliance on the apparent safety of 
a product that he or she finds on the market because the defen- 
dant has put it there; 
* The consumer being the seller's ultimate objective; and 
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* The desirability of avoiding "circuity of action" and allow- 
ing instead irect recovery from intermediaries. 
In his role as Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts [1965], Prosser distilled the previous 30+ years of ac- 
ademic debate and what he regarded as the leading judicial 
opinions about strict product liability into 402A. Nonethe- 
less, injured parties still faced formidable problems of 
proof, only somewhat alleviated by the rule of res ipsa lo- 
quitur, and reaching intermediaries such as wholesalers re- 
mained troublesome. 
Some courts expanded manufacturers' and intermediar- 
ies' liabilities through changes in warranty law. Though he 
roundly criticized warranty law as a means for achieving 
strict liability to consumers, Prosser [1966, p. 791] hailed a 
warranty case as "the fall of the citadel of privity" [Hen- 
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors 1960]. Henningsen upheld 
the validity of product injury claims brought by the spouse 
of a new car purchaser against both the manufacturer and 
the dealer. Pointing to "modem marketing conditions," the 
Henningsen court found that an implied warranty of mer- 
chantability, i.e., that goods are fit to use for the general pur- 
pose for which they were designed, attached to the car and 
followed it through the distribution system to the buyer and 
members of his household. None of the traditional contract 
defenses, particularly privity and warranty disclaimer provi- 
sions, insulated the manufacturer o its dealer from liability. 
In justifying its decision, the court stated its intent to allo- 
cate losses caused by injuries from defective products to the 
parties best able to control the risks and equitably allocate 
the costs [Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors 1960]. 
Justice Roger Traynor of the California Supreme Court pi- 
oneered open judicial acceptance of the strict liability doc- 
trine, which had first appeared in reported cases that in- 
volved food and beverage products [Prosser 1960, pp. 
1103-10]. As early as 1944, in a concurring opinion that 
none of his fellow justices joined, Traynor used public pol- 
icy arguments to advocate the adoption of strict liability for 
defective products [Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. 
1944]. Three years later he unsuccessfully urged his breth- 
ren to impose strict liability "openly and not by spurious ap- 
plication of [res ipsa] rules" [Gordon v. Aztec Brewing 
Co. 1947]. 
By 1963, however, Traynor's position, set forth in Green- 
man v. Yuba Power Products [1963], became law in Califor- 
nia. His opinion, which drew heavily on academic articles 
and treatises, essentially matched the synthesis that Prosser 
had developed and would soon appear as 402A of the Re- 
statement [1965].4 This strict liability doctrine had become 
law in 28 states by 1971; 40 had embraced it by 1976 
[Rabin 1990, p. 81]; and 48 states presently utilize some 
form of strict liability in cases stemming from product- 
related injuries.5 
As currently applied, strictly liability refers to liability 
without reference to the defendant's behavior; instead, it ex- 
amines the nature of the allegedly defective product. That 
is, to recoup damages, the plaintiff consumer must show 
that the defendant marketer's product caused the injury in 
question. Furthermore, the injured plaintiff must prove that 
the product was defective in some manner (e.g., unsafely de- 
signed, improperly manufactured, accompanied by inade- 
quate warnings) when the consumer acquired it. In addi- 
tion, product liability law varies from state to state; hence, 
each is free, for example, to determine how strict liability is 
to be applied within its boundaries. Consequently, there is 
no national strict liability standard, though the Restatement 
[1965] is widely disseminated. 
Strict Product Liability in Used Goods 
Transactions: Case Law 
Neither the voluminous academic literature nor the judicial 
opinions that resulted in strict liability as described here di- 
rectly addressed used goods transactions. The Restatement 
[1965, 402A] does not employ the term "used goods" or 
anything similar, yet 402A leaves ample room for courts 
to bring used goods within its ambit. In general, however, 
the role of strict liability for sellers of used goods has not 
found widespread acceptance in the courts during the 27 
years since the publication of the Restatement [1965, 
402A]. Most states that have examined strict liability 
claims against sellers of used products have ruled in favor 
of the sellers. 
In discussing used goods cases from various jurisdic- 
tions, we have organized the judicial opinions according to 
the principal rationale utilized to resolve the dispute. These 
arguments are summarized in Exhibit 1. 
Seller Knowledge-Actual or Imputed 
Occasional Seller Rationale 
Subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) utilize the word "seller," but 
do not specifically refer to new products or explicitly ex- 
clude used goods marketers. Comment (f) [Restatement 
1965, 402A], "Business of Selling," similarly begs the 
used goods question. It excludes "the occasional seller," 
i.e., one who does not sell the product in question "as part 
of his business." This would apply, for example, to the per- 
son who sells his or her private automobile to either a neigh- 
bor or a used car dealer. 
No jurisdiction holds one-time "casual sellers" of used 
goods to a strict liability standard. Courts faced with that 
prospect have relied on that portion of Comment (f) [Restate- 
ment 1965, 402A] which excludes such parties, though 
this comment does provide that "it is not necessary that the 
seller be engaged solely in the business of selling such prod- 
ucts" [cf. Bailey v. ITT Grinnell 1982; Gorath v. Rockwell 
International 1989]. This comment also includes a broad 
policy rationale, however, which might be read to apply to 
one in the business of selling used goods: 
The basis for the rule is the ancient one of the special responsi- 
bility for the safety of the public undertaken by one who enters 
into the business of supplying human beings with products 
which may endanger the safety of their persons and property, 
and the forced reliance upon that undertaking on the part of 
those who purchase such goods. 
This raises more difficult questions regarding sales of 
equipment previously used in the seller's business. A 
worker sought damages from the Boeing Company for inju- 
ries caused by a used hydraulic planer that Boeing had sold 
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Exhibit 1. Rationale Utilized by Various Jurisdictions to Assess Liability for Used Products Sellers 
Rationale Fundamental Arguments or Logic States 
Seller Knowledge- 
Actual or Imputed 
Occasional Seller Occasional sellers are not strictly liable for personal injuries related to the Massachusetts, Michigan, 
products they sell because they are not regarded as product experts. Minnesota, New Jersey, New 
Occasional sellers are people or organizations who are not in the business York, Ohio, Texas, 
of routinely selling products. Classic consumer examples involve selling a Washington, Wisconsin 
lawnmower to a neighbor, an automobile to a friend, or various products at 
a garage sale. Determining whether an organization is an occasional seller 
is sometimes difficult and depends on the frequency with which such sales 
occur as well as the relative revenues resulting from such sales. 
Resellers' Actions The actions of the used product seller can be determinative if they indicate Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, 
that the seller knew or should have known about the product's dangerous Kansas, New Hampshire, 
propensities. If the product defect was caused by the seller's New Jersey, South Dakota, 
reconditioning or repair work, liability will attach. Wisconsin 
Duty to Warn Duty to warn obligations arise when the used product seller has California, Florida, Illinois, 
knowledge about the product's dangerous characteristics that may not be Indiana, Iowa, Wisconsin 
obvious to buyers. If the seller's knowledge clearly exceeds that of the 
buyer, a duty to warn is more likely to exist. 
Legal Issues 
Causation Causation generally focuses on evidence regarding when the defect Kansas, Louisiana, 
actually came into being. The defense will argue that the defect could Mississippi, South Carolina, 
easily have existed prior to the used product's seller coming in contact Missouri, Oklahoma, 
with the item. This is a compelling argument if the defendant has not Pennsylvania, Wisconsin 
modified or serviced the product but merely resold it. 
Statutory Preemption Certain states have enacted or are considering legislation exempting used Idaho 
goods sellers from strict liability actions. The language in documents 
supporting these statutes general includes many of the arguments 
mentioned herein, particularly those regarding minimum seller knowledge 
about product defects. 
Public Policy 
Chain of Distribution The distribution chain arguments essentially holds the entire channel Arizona, New Jersey, 
responsible for damages because it is the channel that results in products Oregon, Washington 
reaching final consumers. Thus liability passes back up the channel to the 
used goods seller. The channel is therefore responsible for the safety of the 
products it places in the marketplace. This is the same policy argument 
used to justify strict liability for sellers of new products. 
to his employer [Thompson v. Rockford Machine Tool Co. 
1987]. The Washington Court of Appeals held that the Re- 
statement [1965, 402A] applied and found a material issue 
of fact as to whether defendant Boeing, an aircraft manufac- 
turer, was a dealer in used products when it sold the planer. 
In so finding, the court noted that Boeing maintained a sep- 
arate department that handled its used equipment sales. 
Other relevant evidence included the number of items sold, 
revenue generated, and the amount of company resources de- 
voted to used equipment sales [Stiles v. Batavia Atomic 
Horseshoes 1992]. 
A similar outcome transpired in Galindo v. Precision 
American [1985]. A trial court ruled in favor of the seller of 
a used sawmill trimmer that had injured an employee of the 
firm purchasing the device. The Fifth Court of Appeals re- 
versed this decision and remanded the case for the trial 
court to determine if the marketing of used products was a 
routine part of the defendant's business operations. 
In contrast, a New York court found that General Electric 
was no more than an occasional seller when it disposed of 
a high-speed grinding mill in a surplus equipment sale 
[Sukljian v. Charles Ross & Son Co. 1986}. The court de- 
clined to hold General Electric strictly liable for subsequent 
injuries caused by the mill, even though the case involved 
more than the single or isolated sale described in Comment 
(f) [Restatement 1965, 402A]. The court also noted that 
General Electric had the facilities to repair such equipment 
but had not done so because it had been unaware of the de- 
fect that subsequently injured the plaintiff [cf. Bevard v. 
Ajax Manufacturing 1979; Santiago v. E.W. Bliss 1985]. 
As expected, someone in the business of regularly selling 
used products can readily be held to a strict liability stan- 
dard. The plaintiff in Nelson v. Nelson Hardware [1991] re- 
covered from the retailer who had sold him a used firearm 
that turned out to be defective. The retailer bought and sold 
both new and used guns, though he did not stock new mod- 
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els of the weapon in question. The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court found the retailer to be a "seller" for purposes of 
402A of the Restatement [1965] [cf. Ferragamo v Massa- 
chusetts Bay Transportation Authority 1985]. 
Resellers' Actions Rationale 
When the seller has rebuilt or reconditioned products that it 
then sells, strict liability generally applies. A similar consen- 
sus exists when the seller's defective repair work has 
caused injuries [Shapo 1990]. The results are less certain 
when the seller reconditions products utilizing parts pur- 
chased from a third party. 
In Realmuto v. Straub Motors [1974], the New Jersey Su- 
preme Court held that a used car dealer was strictly liable 
for injuries from defective work, repairs, or replacements 
made on a vehicle before reselling it. Other courts have ei- 
ther followed this approach or cited it approvingly in re- 
lated decisions [cf. Shapo 1990, 18.13-18.16; Crandell 
v. Larkin and Jones Appliance 1983; Kodiak Electric Asso- 
ciation v. Delaval Turbine 1984]. 
The buyer plaintiff has even stronger arguments when 
the seller is evasive or dishonest about the nature of the re- 
pair work. In Petrus Chrysler-Plymouth v. Davis [1984], 
the defendant's employee said that an automobile's wiring 
had been repaired when, in fact, nothing had been done. 
The consumer ecovered when the defective part caused a 
fire. 
Alternatively, reseller repair activity does not automati- 
cally result in the plaintiff's recovery. In Barris v. Eddy's 
Toyota of Wichita [1988], the left rear axle of the plaintiff's 
vehicle was repaired by the defendant. When the axle 
failed, the plaintiff sued on the basis of strict liability and 
breach of warranty. The federal district court of Kansas 
granted the defendant's summary motion6 with respect to 
the strict liability claim, stating that the plaintiff consumer 
had failed to provide any evidence that the defendant had 
known that the repair parts might be defective [cf. Bennett 
v. Matt Gay Chevrolet Oldsmobile 1991; Brigham v. 
Hudson Motors 1978]. In addition, other evidence indicated 
that the auto had been operated beyond its design limits. 
An analogous outcome occurred in Rolph v. EGI Compa- 
nies [1991]. The user of a bending roll machine sued both 
the machine's manufacturer and the firm that reconditioned 
the machine at the request of the user's employer. The Wis- 
consin Supreme Court ruled that the key element was that 
the reconditioner did not sell the machine but merely recon- 
ditioned it. Had the machine been resold, i.e., "placed into 
the stream of commerce," by the reconditioner, the firm 
would probably have been held strictly liable. 
Duty to Warn Rationale 
Resellers who do not repair or maintain used products 
could, nevertheless, have a duty to warn buyers about prod- 
uct-related dangers or problems. In Sell v. Bertsch [1984] 
the used machinery seller was found to have no duty to re- 
pair a 40-year-old rolling machine that subsequently injured 
a buyer's employee. But the defendant was denied sum- 
mary judgment when the court ruled that the reseller's pos- 
sible duty to warn the buyer about the dangerous operating 
features of the used machine was a jury question. The same 
outcome was reached with respect to a used printing press 
in Josephs v. Harris Corp. [1982]. 
The plaintiff was unable to recover in Burrows v. Follett 
and Leach [1983], even though a guard was missing from a 
rotating shaft on a used corn picker at the time of purchase. 
The plaintiff buyer had apparently noticed that the guard 
was missing, making the danger obvious to him and 
thereby obviating the need for the defendant o warn him 
about the missing guard. The seller did not ordinarily pur- 
chase used equipment for resale, but did occasionally ac- 
cept such machinery in trade for new equipment. 
In Pridgett v. Jackson Iron & Metal [1971] the plaintiff 
was injured while trying to cut open steel drums with an 
acetylene torch. Among other claims, the plaintiff argued 
that the defendant who sold him the used drums had a duty 
to warn of the dangers involved in working around these 
used containers. The Mississippi Supreme Court rejected 
this contention, noting that the plaintiff had considerable ex- 
perience working with this type of drum. In fact, the plain- 
tiff had specified this particular type of drum when placing 
the order with the defendant scrap metal dealer [cf. Buckbee 
v. Rockwood Insurance 1989]. 
Industry custom with regard to used goods can also lead 
to a verdict in favor of defendant used goods sellers. In May- 
berry v. Akron Rubber Machinery [1979], the defendant sup- 
plied Mayberry with several obsolete parts to be used in as- 
sembling a rubber mixing mill. Since the buyer was an ex- 
pert with regard to these parts and had purchased similar 
parts elsewhere, the seller had no duty to warn about possi- 
ble dangers. Apparently it was customary for buyers and sell- 
ers of such components to acquire them on an "as is" basis 
without inspections or warnings [cf. Ikerd v. Lapworth 
1970; Williams v. Nuckolls 1982; Shirey v. U.S. 1984]. 
Legal Issues 
Causation (Timing of Defect) Rationale 
A majority of the courts considering strict liability for used 
goods sellers have adopted the position of the Illinois Su- 
preme Court as set forth in Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chev- 
rolet Co. [1975].7 Absent allegations that defects in the brak- 
ing system existed in a used car when it left the dealer or 
that the dealer had created the defects, the court declined to 
subject the defendant used car dealer to strict liability. 
Doing so, the majority declared, would make the dealer an 
insurer against defects that had come into existence after 
the product had left the original chain of distribution and 
come under control of one or more consumers. 
In Tauber-Arons Auctioneers v. Superior Court [1980], a 
California appellate court likewise declined to apply strict li- 
ability to used goods sales where no proof existed that the 
defendant seller had created the defect that caused plain- 
tiff's injuries. A worker had sued the seller of a used planer 
that caused his injuries. The court noted that the plaintiff 
had not presented any other bases, such as salespersons' 
statements or promotional brochures, that would have sup- 
ported justifiable expectations regarding the safety, quality, 
and durability of the planer. Furthermore, the court re- 
garded a used goods dealer as outside the "enterprise" that 
produces and distributes the new product to consumers. Con- 
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sequently, there was no continuing business relationship be- 
tween the ordinary used machinery dealer and the manufac- 
turer that would have allowed the former to make adjust- 
ments for the costs of protecting itself against strict 
liability. 
Similarly, in LaRosa v. Superior Court [1981], another 
California court rejected strict liability when defendant 
seller of a used punch press showed that it did not cause the 
product defect in question and had expressly disclaimed 
any responsibility for its condition. The court also observed 
that used goods buyers "consciously" traded off quality 
for lower price. Courts in many other states have also de- 
clined to impose strict liability for latent product defects 
that the used goods dealer neither caused nor could have dis- 
covered by reasonable and customary inspection [cf. Keith 
v. Russell T Bundy & Associates 1986; Grimes v. Axtell 
Ford Lincoln-Mercury 1987]. 
In order to assess properly the issues of timing of the de- 
fect, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed a circuit 
court's summary judgment in favor of a defendant automo- 
bile lessor in Kemp v. Miller 1990. Here the plaintiff was in- 
jured by an allegedly defective rented automobile. The cir- 
cuit court determined that the lessor was not strictly liable 
because it was neither a manufacturer nor seller of automo- 
biles; moreover, there was insufficient evidence to deter- 
mine when the defect occurred. The supreme court disa- 
greed with both of these conclusions and ordered a trial to 
determine when the defect arose. 
Statutory Preemption Rationale 
Occasionally statutes have been interpreted to limit strict li- 
ability actions for used products. For example, the Idaho leg- 
islature has enacted a statute that excludes "commercial 
seller of used products" from the definition of product 
seller [Peterson v. Idaho First National Bank 1990]. Sev- 
eral other states are also considering such exclusionary 
language. 
Public Policy-Chain of Distribution Rationale 
The leading case for invoking strict liability in used goods 
transactions i  the New Jersey case Turner v. International 
Harvester Co. [1975]. Plaintiff s decedent had purchased a 
used truck from defendant ruck dealership. Decedent had 
raised the cab to work on the engine and, while doing so, 
the cab fell and killed him. In addressing the question of 
strict liability for defendant seller of the used truck, the 
court discussed policy considerations. It identified them as 
cost spreading and buyers' justifiable expectations of 
safety, quality, and durability. The latter would be lower for 
used goods and might vary according to the knowledge or 
sophistication of the particular buyer. This raised a factual 
issue under the "unreasonably dangerous" provision of 
402A of the Restatement [1965]. In any event, the court 
said, a seller should bear responsibility for "safety defects, 
whether known or unknown at the time of sale, present 
while the machine was under his control." Thus, the Turner 
decision used an enterprise liability theory (i.e., distribution 
channel as an overall business enterprise) to hold used 
goods sellers strictly liable for defects, including latent 
ones, that existed when the product was under the seller's 
control.8 
Arizona took the same approach in Jordan v. Sunnyslope 
Appliance [1983], a case that involved a used propane fuel 
tank with a defective shut-off valve that caused an explo- 
sion that destroyed plaintiff's house. The opinion followed 
Turner, noting with approval the observation that used prod- 
ucts buyers still expect safety when purchasing a servicea- 
ble product as opposed to junk parts. It further agreed with 
the enterprise liability theory as the basis for invoking strict 
liability and explicitly stated that a seller need not be in the 
"initial chain" of distribution to be regarded as part of the 
enterprise. The court also stated that used goods sellers as a 
class could shift losses, distribute costs, and insure against 
risks.9 [See also Thompson v. Rockford Machine Tool Co. 
1987.] 
Applying Strict Liability to Used 
Products Transactions 
Legal/Policy Questions 
The legal controversies surrounding strict liability for used 
goods marketers largely involve the applicability of enter- 
prise liability theory. Many courts decline to include used 
goods as part of the "enterprise," which, for new goods 
transactions, includes suppliers of component parts, manu- 
facturers, wholesalers, retailers, and other intermediaries. 
Treating the entire production and marketing system as a sin- 
gle enterprise for liability purposes leads to the spreading of 
risks and costs, providing strong incentives for product 
safety, and maximizing consumer protection. Having been 
hurt by a new product, the consumer sues the seller, some 
form of retailer, who in turn brings other members of the dis- 
tribution etwork, including the manufacturer, into the dis- 
pute. The court, by applying the Restatement [1965] and 
common law precedent, then determines who should bear 
burden of compensating the injured consumer. By denying 
used goods buyers access to the marketing "enterprise," 
some courts have effectively required such buyers to carry 
the responsibility for their injuries, regardless of the manner 
in which the product became defective. 
The extent to which manufacturers/marketers of new prod- 
ucts also participate in used goods channels provides an- 
other view of enterprise liability theory. From a "first im- 
pression" standpoint, one might conclude that manufactur- 
ers that are not active in used goods distribution should not 
be found liable under strict liability. Their involvement 
could be described as passive, so why should they be lia- 
ble? This logic is not, however, supported by contemporary 
views of strict liability for new goods. All channel mem- 
bers, including wholesalers [Bittler v. White and Company 
1990], brokers [Oscar Mayer v. Mincing Trading 1990], 
and assemblers [Yost v. Fuscaldo 1991], can be held strictly 
liable for faulty products. Therefore, mere inactivity should 
not insulate manufacturers of used goods from strict 
liability. 
Even the Tillman court, which exempted used product 
sales from strict liability, conceded that under an enterprise 
analysis, strict liability would "logically follow" [Tillman 
v. Vance Equipment Co. 1979]. That court ultimately re- 
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jected the enterprise approach. Instead, it stated that what- 
ever advantages the application of strict liability might offer 
in terms of meeting consumers' product expectations and re- 
ducing risks through incentives for better products were off- 
set by a desire to hold the strict liability doctrine within man- 
ageable bounds [Tillman 1979]. The opinion suggests that 
strict liability would change the very nature of used goods 
markets, presumably by pricing the more dangerous items 
out of the market. 
The extension of strict liability to used goods transac- 
tions probably would raise prices, as the enterprise theory 
predicts. If used goods dealers are required to issue warn- 
ings that take into account he age, appearance, price, and ex- 
pected durability of its wares, prices of these products must 
increase to cover these activities. The same forces yield the 
same result in new product markets, however. We must de- 
cide, as a matter of public policy, if it makes sense to trade 
off product safety for somewhat lower prices in one market 
(used goods) and not the other (new products). We must de- 
termine if buyers of used products have lower expectations 
regarding safety than buyers of new products. Are buyers 
willing to purchase lower-priced used goods and bear the in- 
creased risks associated with the abolition of strict liability 
in these markets? Perhaps some consumers will be able to 
acquire certain products only if they can buy used goods 
without he protection of strict liability. As a society are we 
willing to allow these buyers to make this choice? Ulti- 
mately, the question becomes one of protecting consumers 
and their justifiable xpectations of safe products: Is this ob- 
jective equally compelling for both new and used goods 
transactions? 
Liability for latent defects in used goods raises another 
troublesome question. California, for example, has rejected 
strict liability when the seller of a used punch press had the 
facilities to repair it before the sale, but did not do so [Wilk- 
inson v. Hicks 1982; cf. Meyering v. General Motors Cor- 
poration 1990]. Yet California holds all sellers of new 
goods to strict liability standards for such defects, as do 
most jurisdictions [Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co. 1964; Re- 
statement 1965, 402A; Frumer and Friedman 1988, ch. 6]. 
This extends even to those intermediaries that are expected 
to pass products along to the next firm in the distribution 
channel without inspection. It would seem that the same un- 
derlying policy objectives that the enterprise liability theory 
promotes in these and other new product sales ought to 
apply as well to used goods transactions. 
The enterprise argument for strict liability is further bol- 
stered by looking at what constitutes the difference in legal 
standing between the original and subsequent owners of a 
product-a simple resale of the item. The product has still 
been introduced into the channel by the manufacturer, who 
should bear the responsibility for producing and marketing 
safe products, regardless of who happens to own them. 
Strict liability provides an avenue for users to reach such 
manufacturers/marketers. 
Alternatively, the used product channel or enterprise is dif- 
ferent from new product channels in a simple but signifi- 
cant way: the presence of the used product seller. The inclu- 
sion of this entity within the channel reduces the certainty 
that a product defect occurred during manufacturing be- 
cause the used goods seller had the opportunity to handle 
the product, perhaps even damaging it. Perhaps the used 
product seller overused the item, thereby making it unsafe 
for subsequent use. Holding a manufacturer strictly liable 
when an intermediate owner used the product over an ex- 
tended period of time essentially makes the manufacturer re- 
sponsible to later buyers for the actions of earlier buyers- 
an untenable position for the manufacturer. Thus, enterprise 
liability may place too great a burden on channel members 
handling used products. 
Though courts occasionally hold lessors of used goods 
strictly liable under enterprise liability arguments [cf. Cin- 
trone v. Hertz Truck Leasing 1965; Ausness 1987], rent-to- 
own firms (RTO) have yet to be tested with strict liability 
claims. RTO companies differ from traditional leasing 
firms in that the latter typically provide only financial ser- 
vices and usually do not take physical possession of the 
goods they lease. RTOs, however, engage in hybrid transac- 
tions because their customers can opt out of rental contracts 
or can apply rental fees toward eventual product ownership 
[Nehf 1991]. If an RTO specializes in certain product lines, 
it presumably becomes expert with regard to these prod- 
ucts, most likely repairing them when necessary. Such a 
company thereby possesses knowledge quivalent to that of 
a routine seller of these products. To absolve RTOs of strict 
liability simply because they are legally organized as leas- 
ing companies provides sellers a tantalizing loophole in 
product liability law. 
The most defensible development regarding liability of 
used goods sellers is the shielding of one-time sellers from 
strict liability. To expect someone selling a used lawn- 
mower at a garage sale to guarantee its safety is probably un- 
reasonable-such a seller should not be subject to strict lia- 
bility. However, the courts need to develop a more clear- 
cut definition of "occasional" seller and a decision rule for 
weighting the expertise of such sellers. 
Marketing/Policy Questions 
Some fundamental marketing- and policy-related questions 
need to be investigated. First, buyer expectations, for both 
consumer and industrial segments, regarding used product 
safety expectations need to be determined for various prod- 
uct markets. It is difficult to imagine that a rational used 
product buyer would expect an unsafe product, though he 
or she might anticipate less durability or poorer functional 
performance than with a new one [Turner v. International 
Harvester Co. 1975]. But what kinds of trade-offs are buy- 
ers actually willing to make among safety, durability, perfor- 
mance, and price? Rather than simply asserting opinions on 
this question, courts should consider properly gathered and 
analyzed data bearing on the issue. 
The used vehicle market might be a useful one within 
which to make these assessments. Thousands of claims 
have been filed in the United States for used vehicle-related 
injuries. Though most of these disputes involve warranty or 
negligence actions, the interrelatedness of safety, perfor- 
mance, and price surface routinely. Comparisons could be 
made between judicial assumptions regarding these trade- 
offs and the implicit and explicit assumptions made by used 
vehicle buyers. Used cars are often sold "as is" without 
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any seller representations of quality; however, used car deal- 
ers cannot simply disclaim their tort liability or obligations 
regarding implied warranties of fitness. Therefore, an "as 
is" seller must still inspect the vehicle and place it in 
reasonable working condition [Korpela 1991; Soehnel 
1991]. 
Current research perspectives could prove to be quite use- 
ful here. Bloom [1989], for example, proposes a seven-step 
analysis to determine the appropriate policy stance regard- 
ing information available to consumers in product markets. 
Among these factors are the harm suffered by consumers 
and the availability and type of informational cues (internal 
and external) in the market. Used and new product markets 
could be examined utilizing a framework comprising these 
factors. To the extent that no significant differences can be 
derived when comparing used and new product markets, 
one could argue that the legal system should make no 
distinctions. 
From the used goods buyer's perspective, Bayus [1991] 
found that buyers who replace new automobiles "early" 
are concerned about styling and image, whereas "late" re- 
placement buyers are more concerned about cost. Perhaps 
the same attributes are of relatively similar importance 
when comparing different purchasers of used goods that 
vary in age. That is, those who buy extremely old used prod- 
ucts may have no expectations regarding safety; instead, 
they consider cost and some minimal evel of performance. 
As a matter of public policy, should these people be permit- 
ted to forgo product safety without legal recourse? 
Relatedly, Mowen and Mowen [1991, p. 57] provide in- 
structive propositions. They hypothesize that people have a 
strong tendency to choose courses of action with immediate 
positive outcomes but delayed negative consequences. 
Used goods and their associated safety levels may illustrate 
just such a situation. Consumers can choose used products 
over new goods because of favorable price considerations, 
incorrectly discounting the greater potential dangers of used 
items in the future. If these kinds of choices are being 
made, strict liability could be properly applied, encouraging 
sellers to improve product safety to protect buyers who 
make risky decisions. This suggestion assumes, of course, 
that society should protect these buyers from themselves. Al- 
ternatively, if these buyers cannot be forced to understand 
the risks involved, perhaps they should bear the 
consequences. 
Simply warning prospective used goods buyers, regard- 
less of the legal adequacy of such warnings, may be insuffi- 
cient. Tanner, Hunt, and Eppright [1991, p. 43] conclude 
that communicated threats may not actually be perceived 
by certain audiences as being severe. Buyers with maladap- 
tive coping behaviors, particular consumers with prior safe 
experiences with used goods, may assuage their fears by 
thinking, "It won't happen to me." Such thinking provides 
psychological relief but does nothing to remove potential 
dangers. These results are consistent with the findings of 
Mowen and Mowen [1991] and may indicate that, for some 
people, most warnings will simply be ineffective. 
The critical nature of warnings and other forms of infor- 
mation is also relevant from the standpoint of pricing used 
goods. Tellis and Gaeth [1990] report hat increased levels 
of information lead to "better" choice decisions in terms of 
new product value (price/quality). Marketers need to deter- 
mine if this same relationship holds for used products and if 
the cost of information provision can be passed along to con- 
sumers. More importantly from the standpoint of product 
safety, are consumers willing to choose high-value alterna- 
tives that are both low price and low quality/safety if they 
have adequate information? This is another line of reason- 
ing suggesting that used products buyers may be inclined to- 
ward unsafe choices. 
If used goods sellers must meet a strict liability standard, 
they may be restricted in terms of pricing options. Consum- 
ers may be unwilling to bear the costs of strict liability and 
associated insurance premiums. If this is the case, used 
goods markets may well disappear for some products, at 
least in the United States. The long-term outcome may be 
that used products will be increasingly exported to less- 
developed countries or nations with less stringent liability 
environments. 
The literature on economics of information provides an 
overview perspective on safety-related information. Econo- 
mists and others have examined choice decisions under a va- 
riety of conditions with respect to risk, information quality, 
information availability, bargaining power, insurance cover- 
age, etc. [cf. Mazis et al. 1981; Schwartz 1988; Smith 
1990]. It would be useful to know if the assumptions made 
and conclusions reached in new product markets are 
equally relevant for used goods. 
Conclusion 
On balance, extending strict liability to sellers of used 
goods would serve many of the public policy goals that the 
doctrine fosters for new product transactions. One differ- 
ence, a critical one that needs to be investigated empiri- 
cally, is the level of consumer reliance on the apparent 
safety of used goods. Do consumers believe that used 
goods are as safe as new products, or do they equate lower 
used goods prices with a lesser degree of safety? And, if the 
latter question is answered affirmatively, should society per- 
mit the safety-price trade-off? 
Enterprise liability can also be applied to used products 
channels, but the situation is complicated by the potential in- 
tervening and unknown actions of prior owners of used 
goods. Holding used goods sellers strictly liable essentially 
makes them responsible for the consequences of actions of 
persons (prior product owners) over whom they have abso- 
lutely no control. Such an outcome creates a legal problem 
in that it violates the causation requirement of the strict lia- 
bility doctrine. However, failure to inspect used products or 
warn buyers about dangers known to the seller seems to be 
reasonable grounds for strict liability. 
Therefore, commercial organizations that regularly mar- 
ket used products should be held strictly liable. The word 
"regularly" brings such sellers within the conventional 
used goods enterprise and the failure to inspect or warn can 
be linked causally with the consumer's injury. Occasional 
sellers, those not in the business of routinely selling used 
goods, should not be held strictly liable because they are 
not a part of the marketing enterprise that redistributes used 
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products. Such sellers are also unlikely to be expert with re- 
gard to the quality of the items they are selling. 
Notes 
1. Restatements are compilations or summaries by the American 
Law Institute of common (case) law, organized by subject mat- 
ter, e.g., torts, trusts, contracts. Restatements are not binding on 
a court, but they do reflect the reasoning of important jurisdic- 
tions and the thinking found in particularly well-crafted judicial 
opinions. 
2. This analysis examines trict liability only for physical injuries. 
Strict liability for economic harm is not covered in this review, 
nor are products sold as "junk" or "scrap." 
3. Privity of contract, described in the classic English case of Win- 
terbottom v. Wright [1842], permitted an injured person a tort re- 
covery only from the party that had sold him or her the injury- 
causing product. A tort action is a legal action for a breach of 
duty that does not come from a contract, but is imputed by the 
law. For example, the tort of negligence alleges a breach of 
duty of reasonable care that common law holds people owe to 
one another. 
4. The relevant portion of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
[1965] is 402A (Special Liability of Seller of Product for Phys- 
ical Harm to User or Consumer): 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unrea- 
sonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his prop- 
erty is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused 
to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a 
product, and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer 
without substantial change in the condition in which it 
is sold. 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the prepara- 
tion and sales of his product, and 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from 
or entered into any contractual relation with the seller. 
5. Virginia has expressly not adopted strict product liability 
[Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Orling & Neal 1988]. North Carolina 
has also refused to impose strict liability on defendants in prod- 
uct liability litigation. This information is based on a 5/3/92 
search of the Lexis [1992] legal and periodical electronic 
libraries. 
6. A judgment by the court, prior to a jury verdict, that an issue 
can be decided as a matter of law given the facts of the case. Ei- 
ther plaintiff or defendant can move for summary judgment. 
7. Our review of strict liability for sellers of used products yielded 
cases from 29 states. A recent review by Korpela [1991] identi- 
fied 28 states that have heard strict liability allegations related 
to used products. 
8. The concept of enterprise liability was first widely discussed in 
the marketing literature in commentaries on the DES market- 
share litigation [cf. Boedecker and Morgan 1986; Sheffet 
1983]. In these cases the defendant "enterprise" was the vari- 
ous competitors marketing DES during certain time periods. 
Each of these firms was held liable for the collective acts of the 
enterprise (and each tried to exonerate itself by blaming others) 
because the fungible nature of DES made it impossible for plain- 
tiffs to identify any one defendant's DES as the harmful sub- 
stance. Thus, the DES and related cases examined competition 
among firms at the same horizontal level within competing, sim- 
ilar channels and formed the enterprise among these firms. 
In the present discussion the "enterprise" is the traditional 
vertical channel of distribution. In a product liability action in- 
volving a used product, the plaintiff typically sues all members 
of the channel or enterprise involved in marketing the used prod- 
uct. If the court cannot determine which channel member's ac- 
tions led to the product causing the plaintiff s injuries, the chan- 
nel as an enterprise can be held liable. Channel members must 
then sort out among themselves how to share the burden of com- 
pensating the plaintiff. See Priest [1985] for detailed views of 
vertical and horizontal enterprise liability. 
9. Arizona reasserted its acceptance of enterprise liability in Tor- 
res v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber [1990] when a trademark licen- 
sor (supplier of allegedly faulty automobile tire) was included 
in a strict liability action. 
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